Solidity 0.5: when typed does not mean type safe by Crafa, Silvia & Di Pirro, Matteo
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
02
95
2v
1 
 [c
s.P
L]
  5
 Ju
l 2
01
9
Solidity 0.5: when typed does not mean type safe
Silvia Crafa1 and Matteo Di Pirro2
1 University of Padova, Italy crafa@math.unipd.it
2 Kynetics, Italy matteo.dipirro@kynetics.com
Abstract. The recent release of Solidity 0.5 introduced a new type to
prevent Ether transfers to smart contracts that are not supposed to re-
ceive money. Unfortunately, the compiler fails in enforcing the guarantees
this type intended to convey, hence the type soundness of Solidity 0.5 is
no better than that of Solidity 0.4. In this paper we discuss a paradig-
matic example showing that vulnerable Solidity patterns based on poten-
tially unsafe callback expressions are still unchecked. We also point out
a solution that strongly relies on formal methods to support a type-safer
smart contracts programming discipline, while being retro-compatible
with legacy Solidity code.
Keywords: type soundness · smart contracts · address type
1 Introduction
Over the last few years the execution of smart contracts on the blockchain has
emerged as a form of distributed programming of a global computer. Anyone can
deploy a global service, encoded as a smart contract, that can be used by mu-
tually untrusted parties to “safely” interact with no need of a central authority.
Therefore it is of paramount importance that the intended interaction provided
by the service is “correctly” implemented by the code of the corresponding con-
tract. Indeed, while the term contract is generally used to refer to an interaction
that is intended to be enforced by law, a smart contract on the blockchain is
intended to be automatically enforced : the law is embodied by the code to be
executed (see the TheDAO affair [1]).
Formal methods have a long tradition of successes in dealing with the subtle
mismatches between program specification and code implementation, and they
can be helpful also in the new context of smart contracts. Here we focus on
Solidity, the most widely used programming language in Ethereum’s ecosystem,
and on formal methods that provide support for a safer programming discipline
by acting directly at the programming language level. In particular, since Solid-
ity is a statically typed language, we foster the use of types as a tool to shape
and substantiate the programmer’s reasoning. However, static typing conveys an
effective programming discipline only if type constraints are actually enforced
by the compiler. In other terms, there is a gap between the definition of types
in a language and their type-safe usage. We show below that this is precisely
the case of the last release of Solidity 0.5. Indeed, the newly-introduced type
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address payable is intended to prevent Ether transfers to smart contracts that
are not supposed to receive money, but the compiler fails to enforce such seman-
tics. In other words, the type soundness of Solidity 0.5 is no better than that of
the previous release.
Formal methods and the theory of typed languages show the way to bridge
that gap and develop a statically typed language that is also type-safe. In partic-
ular, since Solidity contracts are reminiscent of class-based objects in distributed
Object-Oriented Languages, it is worth to study how the rich and well-known
theory of OOLs can be reused and adapted to smart contracts programming.
In a previous work we defined the Featherweight Solidity typed calculus ([3]),
which formalizes the core of the Solidity language and the basic type soundness
provided by its compiler (both versions 0.4 and 0.5). In that work we also pro-
posed a refined typing that enjoys a stronger soundness property, but remains
retro-compatible with legacy Solidity code. That typing ensures safer accesses
to contracts through their address; hence it statically prevents a general class
of runtime errors. We show here that the unsafe usage of the address payable
type can be statically captured by the refined type system put forward in [3].
Therefore, it represents a solution to the soundness issue of Solidity 0.5 and
supports an effective smart contract programming discipline using the compiler
as a convenient building tool.
2 The problem
As in class-based Object-Oriented Languages, the declaration of a Solidity con-
tract C defines a contract type C. However, instances of such a contract are often
referred to by the Solidity code through expressions of type address, that es-
sentially represent an untyped way to access them. Such expressions must then
be cast to the type C in order to call the functions provided by the contract
C. Casting an untyped pointer is notoriously a very flexible but subtle feature
requiring programmers to precisely know what pointers refer to. Solidity’s com-
piler provides no help here: neither static or dynamic checks are performed on
cast expressions, and a dynamic error is raised only when calling a function (or
accessing a state variable) that is not provided by the underlying contract.
Two features of Solidity make this problem pervasive in the code of smart con-
tracts. First of all, in Ethereum the instances of smart contracts deployed on the
blockchain can only be accessed through their public address. Secondly, contract
functions make extensive use of their implicit variables this and msg.sender,
that are dynamically bound to the contract instance being executed and the
address of the caller contract, respectively. Therefore, while the callee is re-
ferred to through a typed pointer (as in OOLs), the caller is referred to through
an untyped one. Hence, even though usual method recursion is type-safe, all
the callback expressions undergo potentially unsafe usages. Indeed, besides the
dangerous casts described above, a typical Solidity pattern consists in calling
msg.sender.transfer(n) to send n Ether from the balance of the callee to that
of the caller. However, such a transfer implicitly calls the fallback function of the
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contract referred to by msg.sender, thus raising a dynamic error if such function
has not been defined by that contract.
To mitigate this problem, the last release of Solidity (i.e. version 0.5 [2])
distinguishes two types, address and address payable, where the second one
denotes addresses pointing to contracts that declare the fallback function. Ide-
ally, by using the new type address payable, Solidity 0.5 intends to statically
prevent at least the unsafe money transfers, that are actually the most common
form of the dynamic errors described above. It is worth to observe that these er-
rors, that in OOLs are known as message-not-understood, are particularly harm-
ful in the context of the blockchain. Indeed, in Ethereum the occurrence of a
dynamic error causes the initial transaction to be interrupted and rolled-back
(the so-called revert). This makes the account that issued that transaction lose
the money it paid to the miner node and possibly leads to Ether indefinitely
locked into a contract’s balance. Hence, there is a pressing requirement to issue
a transaction only if it can be statically guaranteed that it will not evolve to a
revert.
Unfortunately, Solidity 0.5 fails to prevent unsafe money transfers at compile-
time. As a matter of fact, no type check is enforced by the compiler to ensure
that a variable of type address payable is substituted with the address of a
contract that actually provides a fallback function. The problem can be detected
with a careful read of the documentation1, which states:
It might very well be that you do not need to care about the distinction
between address and address payable and just use address everywhere.
For example, if you use the withdraw pattern you most likely do not have
to change your code because transfer is only used on msg.sender instead
of stored addresses and msg.sender is an address payable.
[...] Address literals can be implicitly converted to address payable.
[...] In external function signatures address is used for both the address
and the address payable type.
Concretely, the counterexample in Figure 1 shows that the implicit vari-
able msg.sender is assumed to be of type address payable, but no check is
performed on the type of the actual caller’s address. More precisely, the expres-
sion msg.sender.transfer(10) in the body of the function of the contract Test
(line 26) correctly compiles, and so does the call of this function from the con-
tract WithoutFallback (line 11). However, issuing a transaction that invokes the
function callUnsafeContract of WithoutFallback results in a revert as that
contract cannot receive money back from the contract Test. The same problem
occurs if the functions are marked public or private instead of external. Further-
more, in order for the contract WithoutFallback to refer to a deployed instance
of the contract Test, its constructor can only accept a parameter of address type
and then cast it to the expected contract type (line 7). Even if nothing ensures
that the actual parameter refers to an instance of Test, the cast expression
correctly compiles and correctly executes, postponing the dynamic check to the
1 https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.5.9/050-breaking-changes.html
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1 pragma solidity >=0.5.0 <0.7.0;
2
3 contract WithoutFallback {
4 Test _test;
5
6 constructor (address _unsafeAddress ) payable public {
7 _test = Test ( _unsafeAddress );
8 }
9
10 function callUnsafeContract () external {
11 _test.foo();
12 }
13
14 function testUnsafeCast () external {
15 address _addr = address (_test);
16 // _addr.transfer (10) ; // DOES NOT COMPILE
17 address payable _payAddr = address (uint160(_addr));
18 _payAddr .transfer (10) ;
19 }
20 }
21
22 contract Test {
23 constructor () payable public {}
24
25 function foo() external {
26 msg.sender.transfer (10) ;
27 }
28 }
Fig. 1. Counterexample to the type safety of Solidity 0.5
moment where the test reference is actually used (line 11). The constructor’s
parameter unsafeAddress could also be of type address payable. In this case,
one might expect the compiler to check that, when casting a payable address to
a contract type, the target type of the cast (i.e. Test) at least defines a fallback
function. Again, this is not true. No check is performed, either at compile-time or
at run-time, to ensure that Test respects the constraints that address payable
is supposed to impose.
The example also shows (in function testUnsafeCast) that the transfer
primitive can be correctly used only on addresses of static type address payable,
but the type constraint can be circumvented by resorting to an intermediate cast
to the type uint160, as explicitly stated by the official documentation. Clearly,
the expression payAddr.transfer(10) at line 18 dynamically raises an error
since there is no fallback function in the Test contract.
We tested the code in Figure 1 with Remix, the online Ethereum IDE, using
the version 0.5.9+commit.e560f70d of the Solidity compiler.
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Money transfers that dynamically lead to errors were possible since the first
release of Solidity, so the new version has not introduced a new problem. On the
other hand, the addition of the new type address payable to capture the (ad-
dresses of) contracts that can “safely” receive Ether, generates into programmers
the expectation that “safely” means type-safely, that is the compiler will check
it. In fact nothing has actually changed w.r.t. version 0.4: the new type essen-
tially provides only a refined documentation about addresses, but programmers
have certainly more confounded expectations.
3 The solution
The typed theory of programming languages allows to identify a type preserva-
tion issue in Solidity 0.5’s type system, confirmed by the code in Figure 1, and
also offers a solution. In a previous work ([3]) we developed a precise formaliza-
tion of the core of the Solidity language and its type system. We resorted to a
formalization style that is reminiscent of the well known Featherweight Java lan-
guage [4], highlighting the similarities between the notions of object and smart
contract. Along with a precise definition of the basic type-soundness provided by
the Solidity compiler, we proposed a refined type system that enjoys a stronger
soundness property. In particular, that typing solves the type preservation prob-
lem pointed out here. Furthermore, the solution put forward in [3] is general
enough to statically prevent not just unsafe calls to a non existent fallback func-
tion, but all the message-not-understood errors arising from unsafe casts from
addresses to contract types.
The key idea is twofold. First, the type address is refined with type infor-
mation about the contract it refers to. That is, address〈C〉 is the type of the
addresses of instances of the contract C, or of a contract that inherits form C.
In particular, assuming a dummy contract Top
fb
that only contains a fallback
function with an empty body, the type address〈Top
fb
〉 has the same meaning of
Solidity 0.5’s address payable. Indeed, it is the (super-)type of the addresses
of every contract that can safely accept money transfers.2
The second idea is to enrich functions’ signatures with the maximum type
allowed for the caller, so that functions can only be invoked by contracts with
an expected (super-)type. Adding a type constraint for the caller in function
signatures is essential to safely type the implicit msg.sender parameter, thus to
guarantee type preservation. The compiler can then statically check potentially
unsafe callback expressions, such as msg.sender.transfer(n) or
C(msg.sender).foo(), that reduce to a revert if msg.sender is bound to the
address of a contract that has no fallback function or does not have type C,
respectively.
The counterexample in Figure 1 can be fixed by choosing a suitable refined
signature for the foo function of the contract Test. As the only requirement for
2 In [3] we proposed the keyword payableaddress as a syntactic sugar for the type
address〈Top
fb
〉, since at the time of writing we were not aware of Solidity 0.5.
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the caller is to provide a fallback function, it is sufficient to amend the function’s
code as follows:
function foo() <Top
fb
> external {
msg.sender.transfer (10) ;
}
In the body of the function, the variable msg.sender is then assumed to have
type address〈Top
fb
〉, hence the call to transfer is now well typed. On the other
hand, the compiler prevents the unsafe money transfer by identifying a type error
in the function call at line 11, since the caller’s type, WithoutFallback, is not
a subtype of Top
fb
. As a further example, the following function, whose refined
signature specifies the expected (super-)type of the caller, could be safely added
to the Test contract:
function boo() <WithoutFallback > external {
WithoutFallback (msg.sender). testUnsafeCast ();
}
To simplify the notation, and in line with the Solidity programming style, in [3]
we proposed a syntactic sugar based on a new function marker, payback, for
functions whose caller must simply provide a fallback function (which is the
most common case). In this way the foo function inside the Test contract would
simply become as follows:
function foo() payback external {
msg.sender.transfer (10) ;
}
Similarly, the standard function signature with no annotation could correspond
to assuming the (super-)type address〈Top〉, that is no constraint for the caller.
Further details about the formalization of this idea, its type-soundness, and
its retro-compatibility with Solidity contracts already deployed on the blockchain
can be found in [3]. We just observe here that, despite the usage of the convenient
payback marker, to take advantage of the full power of the refined typing the
major effort required to Solidity programmers is to annotate their functions with
the required (super-)type of the caller. Such a requirement might be verbose,
but it actually supports a safer programming discipline, where types mirror the
programmer’s reasoning and the compiler can be effectively used as a convenient
building tool.
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